$ASML podcast mentions

Name: $ASML podcast mentions
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Per Ticker.id: 62 ASML ($ASML) mentions across 14 podcasts (30 days) — timestamped, verifiable quotes, updated 2026-10-20.

The, the fundamental underlying, um, sort of point is that lithography, from an export control perspective, is what you would call the strongest point of leverage for the US and its allies. And that ultimately comes down to the fact that it is by far the hardest tool to indigenize. It is the hardest tool for China to make itself. And that's reflected in sort of a lot of different, you know, you can see that in a lot of different aspects of industry. The cost of lithography tools is far higher than the cost of other tools. The R&D expenditure by ASML is far higher than the expenditure by, maybe not far higher, but higher than the expenditure of other toolmakers that, you know, are across many different product lines.
Nick Brown · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20
And if you sort of dig into, uh, the numbers and the state of play, uh, we're— we feel pretty confident that China will not be able to make its own DUV systems that are good enough to make AI chips, um, at a large enough scale to really expand its own chipmaking until into the 2030s. And so what that means, what that all adds up to, is a really large point of leverage. For the US. So that's sort of like scene setting point number 1. Scene setting point number 2, I alluded to this earlier, but to get sort of more specific about it, there's many different generations of DUV systems. There's like the very most advanced ASML systems, and then there's the very earliest ones that were made back in, you know, in the 2000s.
Nick Brown · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20
But the version of the ASML systems, and that's the NXT1980, for the nerds out there, that we allow into China is good enough for, again, this 7-nanometer logic and HBM2e, maybe even a bit of HBM3 that are used in Huawei's chips. Right now, we allow that to go into China, and there's various ways within China that those tools can end up contributing to AI chip production that we can get into if it's of interest. But China has very astutely recognized that, you know, we have a big, big cannonball-sized hole. It's not really a loophole. We call it a cannonball hole in our export controls. And they've taken advantage of that and are importing a staggering number of systems.
Nick Brown · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20
We, we estimated— we've estimated their entire installed base and we've estimated their rate of imports at about 90 systems in 2024 and 2025, which is tens of, over $10 billion, you know, close to two-thirds of ASML's entire immersion, DUV immersion exports, and really a vast amount. Now to get to sort of your question, Jordan, about scenarios and how things play out. I think as Akib was saying that right now the U.S. is ahead of China. We are dramatically ahead of China, in fact, in overall chipmaking and compute capacity. And that is because China is constrained by a number of different things, you know, not just lithography, other kinds of SME etch and deposition that have been restricted by US controls. And that's kept them to a very small number of chips.
Nick Brown · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20
I should say that the, the nationwide controls, the big bad bucket of SME, is also in a very meaningful sense what the Act is doing is it is aligning, um, the controls on these, these allied tools with, um, steps that the U.S. has already been willing to take on tools that are produced by its own SME makers. So that is also in a very meaningful sense a, an alignment, and hence, uh, the name, the MATCH Act. Briefly, how it does that It sort of— it directs the Commerce Department to engage in negotiations with allies for, I think it's about 150 days, because all else equal, everyone would prefer if these tools are controlled nationally using the authorities of the Dutch government and of the Japanese government and all other governments when it is that government's toolmaker that makes it. For example, for ASML, of course, that's the Netherlands. Everyone would prefer that solution.
Nick Brown · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20
So the MATCH Act does two things, right? It would restrict the export of these tools, uh, to China or further export, but it also restricts the servicing of these tools, right? So there's ASML engineers, there's Tokyo Electron engineers currently stationed in China that helps fix these tools whenever they break in a Chinese fab. How do you think about that? Do you think it's necessary to also restrict servicing? How much impact would that have? Or do you think it's just necessary to stop future exports and let the servicing keep rolling, especially since that's so much of these companies' revenue?
Akib · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20
And okay, so if we pull this servicing from advanced fabs in particular, I think one of the biggest questions I have had when trying to do the research for the MATCH Act and the biggest source of unclarity is what actually breaks down, right? So it's my understanding that, you know, there's ASML and Tokyo Electron engineers there, but they use a lot of Chinese contractors or a lot of those engineers themselves are Chinese and they're not going to leave if you restrict the servicing. Um, maybe some of the parts that you're replenishing are also made in China. Does anything actually break? Is this something that hammers Chinese production tomorrow? Or what breaks first? What are the timelines for it? How should we sort of forecast this in our heads?
Akib · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20
Like, I, I think the story that the Chinese government ended up telling themselves when it came to importing the, uh, Nvidia chips is likely to repeat itself in this context of being like, all right, you guys don't want to sell us them at some point in the indefinite future, fine, like, we'll figure it out, you know, we got this whole crack team of engineers, we're stealing ASML blueprints, like, we'll get there, like, we'll see you on the other side, um, as opposed to, uh, you know, really throwing the gauntlet down and you know, forcing Trump to cave on something that, you know, is kind of hard to do when it's, when it's law.
Jordan Schneider · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20
And then stacked beyond that is, at what point do they convert that prototype and qualify it for commercial production? And then beyond that, there is, how quickly do they scale up their commercial production to the point where they are making high tens of systems, 100 systems per year? As I said, right now, you know, we find that they've got 340 ASML litho systems already at their advanced fabs, which is a shame. Actually, sorry, not at their advanced fabs, at, in the country, split between advanced and legacy fabs. And it is a shame that we have sort of let that many flow into the country. And I think in retrospect, a strategic loss. But what that means is that to really move the needle, China's indigenous production, uh, is— it's not, you know, 5 systems, 10 systems, 20 systems ultimately don't move the needle that much.
Nick Brown · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20
And, you know, we, we've— in our modeling, we include indigenous production, including, you know, as early as 2030. But I will say that I've also run the numbers, uh, even assuming what you might call a hyper-aggressive indigenization where China announces a prototype for 7 nanometer, uh, like an equivalent of NXT 1980 next year, which would be far faster than ASML did in the past. Um, and then the year after that, they, they achieve commercial production and then they scale it up 100% year over year, which would be faster than at any point, um, in the ASML, you know, US allied litho ecosystem. And even then, in that most aggressive scenario, uh, China's existing stockpile and their indigenous production still does not come close to U.S. allied production.
Nick Brown · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20
Maybe one, one thing I will say, how do, do these lithography controls compare to, um, controls that are already exist on deposition and etch? And that is quite relevant, I think, to the political economy of MATCH. You know, MATCH is the MATCH Act, right? The— certainly the branding and in many ways the impact is aligning allied controls with US controls. Now, one example of this is, you know, for these entity controls, as I mentioned, the US controls everything and the allies just control a small set. So it levels that up. But even for the countrywide controls, for the Litho, I think in a very meaningful sense, it is an alignment action. Now, it is true that, you know, for litho, it's made by ASML in the Netherlands with a small sliver by Nikon in Japan, but it's really all ASML. But, and we hit on this a little bit, the US has demonstrated many times, including in October 2022, the initial set of controls.
Nick Brown · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20
Along with the chip controls, the US hit, I think, 11 deposition tools that at the time, The US was the only toolmaker that would make. I think they were mostly AMAT. And the US did that unilaterally, you know, was not asking the allies to do that at all. And that was sort of a demonstration of the commitment to fully control countrywide tools that benefit advanced production. And, you know, if you look at the whole scope of the advanced controls, even outside of lithography, for deposition, etch, metrology. There are many, many US tools with the same profile as the NXT 1980, which is this ASML litho system, that are controlled countrywide. And the Dutch had been more resistant to doing the same, I think, or it is reported, for lithography.
Nick Brown · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20
Now in terms of Japan itself, it is, it's, you know, I won't, I won't claim to sort of know Japan's internal position on MATCH. I'm sure it is on their radar. But ASML is, is the company that is selling the vast majority of the immersion tools. And Japan, you know, Nikon has a very small segment of the immersion economy. Now, Match does potentially, depending on where it winds up in, you know, conference, might end up controlling other tools where Japan has more exposure. But at least for litho, for DUV, Japan is far less exposed. And it does have its own memory manufacturer. This is not certain, that Japan would be more positive on it than the Netherlands.
Nick Brown · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20
You know, uh, yeah, uh, you know, they're, they are welcome to, uh, to sell to ASML, um, for any end use other than, um, in this, in this theory, um, this notional scenario for any end use other than, um, you know, uh, shipping, uh, to China. Um, you know, export authority is, is a different thing. Than selling, um, you know, restricting the sale of systems. I agree that in some sense, you know, from ASML's perspective, it's like, man, why, why does our subsidiary have to be in the US? But, um, uh, to be fair, Cymera was in the US well before it was an ASML subsidiary. So, uh, we had them first.
Nick Brown · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20
Well, this is, this is no farm. Of a, um, of a threat certainly, but you know, some ASML leadership, uh, that, that, that could be helpful. Um, I do think that, you know, uh, certainly as, as far as lithography goes, um, they are, they are the, the masters. There is, there is no comparison. Um, and ultimately that's just to bring it sort of back to the theme. That is why there is so much leverage available. Because almost nobody can match ASML.
Nick Brown · ChinaTalk · The MATCH Act and China’s DUV Imports · 2026-10-20